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Privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) in mobile 
platforms typically restrict undesired information flow 
based on its sensitivity. However, sensitivity is often 
regarded as dichotomous and inflexible to the ever-
changing contexts. Improving the effectiveness of PETs 
requires a better understanding of these contexts. In 
this paper, we examine the influence of contextual 
factors in users’ mobile usage based on Nissenbaum’s 
framework of contextual integrity. Specifically, we 
conducted a user study (n = 2889) to investigate the 
influence of relevance of information types on the 
willingness of disclosure towards typical groups of 
recipient. While the results suggest a significant 
relationship between information relevance (of 
different information) and willingness to disclose (to 
different recipients), closer examination reveals the 
relationship is not always clear-cut, and there is a 
potential influence of recipient. Therefore, 
incorporating the recipient factor can serve as a 
potential improvement to the existing approach in 
privacy management in the mobile device. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) in the 
mobile platforms often relies on permissions 
management to restrict undesired information flow. 
However, the current approach in permissions 
management alone is not optimal as it often regards 
data ‘privacy’ as dichotomies—sensitive and non-
sensitive, risky and non-risk, private (personal) and 
not-private, identifiable and non-identifiable—where 
only one half warrant privacy consideration. In the 
mobile platforms, users are usually prompted with 
consent dialogue or permission prompt whenever an 
app request for ‘sensitive’ data for the first time. 
Classifying the sensitivity or riskiness of 
information leads to a troubling issue. Sensitive 
information is often predefined by the respective OS 
platform. However, what information constitute as 
sensitive is subject to the users’ varying privacy 
preferences and may also vary according to 
circumstances. A study [1] found data sensitivity did 
not significantly affect the willingness to disclose. This 
suggests that relying on predefined sensitive 
information may be impractical in serving a broad user 
base. Sensitive information is often deemed so because 
it is identifiable, but this assumption could not apply as 
any piece of information is potentially an identifier or 
at least a quasi-identifier [2]. Piecing together related 
quasi-identifiers would paint a more comprehensive 
picture of an individual, resulting in an ensuing of 
privacy loss, regardless of the person’s intent. 
When a type of information is regarded as 
identifiable, it can become sensitive when disclosing it 
“may result in harm to its subjects” [3]. However, 
predicting which type of information can inflict harm 
is subjective and may not always consistent [4, 5]. 
Similarly, The OECD Privacy Framework [6] also 
clarified that certain data could become sensitive 
depending on the context and use, despite not being so 
at first glance. Even classification of private 
information is also problematic, whereby “the same 
information may be regarded as very private in one 
context and not so private or not private at all in 
another” [7]. Users often consider “a richer space of 
information” before disclosing a piece of information 
through a mobile device, instead of just taking into 
account of “sensitivity” [8].  
Thus, defining privacy by sensitivity alone is 
problematic because sensitivity is usually at the 
discretion of the provider, who may not always act in 
the consumer’s best interests [9-11]. There is also an 
inherent limitation in computing sensitivity as nuances 





of social interaction are often abstracted away [12], 
bounded by statistical models and computing 
resources.  Even back in 1969, the measure of 
“sensitivity” is already recognized as being vary 
“…depends in large measure upon the context in which 
it was first given, and the context in which it is later 
used” [13]. Another contentious issue is that there is no 
universal definition of “privacy” [7, 14-16], let alone 
the definition of “sensitivity” (in the context of PET). 
Contextual integrity [17] evaluates whether the 
flow of information is appropriate in a given context. 
Contexts, actors, attributes and transmission principles 
are the key factors in shaping the informational norms. 
The framework evaluates, in a given context, which 
sender (actor) can share what type of information 
(attribute) with which recipient (actor) regarding 
whose information (subject) under certain conditions 
(transmission principles). It suggests that public outcry 
will erupt whenever there is a violation of an 
information norm. We can utilize this property to 
identify privacy violation that is dependent on the 
current social norm, without subscribing to a rigid 
definition of privacy. As such, we can construe CI as a 
“framework for socially regulating information flows 
that is legitimate separately from the contest over 
‘privacy’” [18]. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 reviews related works. Section 3 reports on 
Study 1. Section 4 contains Study 2. Section 5 
discusses the results of the user studies. Section 6 
concludes this work. 
 
2. Background  
 
In our previous study [19], while there was 
evidence of demographical differences on trust, 
privacy concern and self-disclosure, we did not find 
any evidence to suggest demographic backgrounds 
significantly predict those three factors. The lack of 
evidence suggests it may not be helpful to categorize 
users and caution the use of privacy profiling adopted 
in privacy recommendation systems. The mediation 
effect—as evidenced in our result—was significant 
regardless of demographic. Our findings, in a way, are 
consistent with [4] that show consumer across those 
categories (including those so-called ‘unconcerned’) 
could share a similar view on privacy expectations. In 
a series of studies conducted by [20], the results 
suggested individuals’ privacy preferences are not 
necessarily relevant to the disclosure decision. This 
further demonstrates classifying consumer by privacy 
preference or concern is not effective. 
The results also suggest trust having a significant 
influence on the user’s disclosure behavior, particularly 
on the relationship between privacy concern and self-
disclosure. The mediation effect of trust in our results 
suggest its significant role in determining users’ self-
disclosure despite the existence of privacy concern. 
Our results, to some extent, are in line with an SNS 
study that argued that privacy concern might not 
necessarily inhibit self-disclosure [21, 22]. 
Existing studies have shown users often assess an 
information flow based on diverse contextual factors. 
A series of studies [23, 24] showed a significant 
influence of purpose on users’ subjective judgement. 
This is also in line with [25] that showed users are 
more willing to disclose information when it is 
perceived to be relevant to the function provided by the 
receiving service provider. These studies, in a way, 
also suggest users are increasingly demanding mobile 
apps to be more upfront about information request. 
This is evident in a study [8] where the results suggest 
users consider app visibility as an essential factor in 
deciding on permission request, as users are usually not 
comfortable with an app collecting data in the 
background. A study on personal health data [1] 
showed participants considered not only the recipient 
but also the data type before disclosure. The result is 
also in line with [4] which showed the influence of the 
type of information, contextual actor (recipient) and 
purpose of information; the study also showed 
‘sensitivity’ is subjectively influenced by contextual 
factors.  
Thus, in this study, we venture on the following 
research question: 
RQ: What are the effects of the relevance of 
information types to different recipient, on the 
willingness to disclose? (Figure 1) 
In this paper, we undertake a study to investigate 
the relationship of data type and its relevance on the 
willingness to disclose to specific groups of recipients. 
Distinct from other similar studies [4, 26] which utilize 
generic data types, our study is more specific to mobile 






















We located existing studies [4, 26] that are closest 
to the purpose of our study, to examine a varying 
willingness of disclosure on the different data type. 
The lists of data type adapted in those studies were 
derived from [27] and [28], respectively. We initially 
considered to adapt the measures from those sources; 
however, we later found the derivation methods behind 
[27] and [28] to be not sufficiently transparent. We 
also consider the lists to be generic and may not be 
pervasive in mobile device usage. This entails the 
necessity of enumerating a list of information types 
commonly disclosed by mobile users, so that Study 2 
can be conducted based on empirical results. 
To improve the relevance of the responses, we pre-
tested the questionnaire over several iterations, each 
time with improvement on the question’s clarity. To 
avoid priming the participants, we took precaution to 
avoid “privacy” keyword in our questionnaire’s title 
and description, and in the questions (refer to 
Appendix for questionnaire sample). 
We advertised the survey on Mechanical Turk for 
nine days in May 2019. Participants were asked to 
respond to our survey that we implemented on 
LimeSurvey. Participants spent 3 min and 57 seconds 
on average (median = 3 minutes 15 seconds) to 
complete the survey. Participants were paid USD 0.10 
for completing the survey. Mechanical Turk enabled us 
to recruit hundreds of participants that are more diverse 
than a university sample (that is often used as a 
convenience sample) [29-31] within a reasonable 
timeframe [32]. The questionnaires (including Study 
2’s) were approved by the Human Research Ethics 
Committee of our institution (equivalent to IRB 
approval in the US) before the recruitment of 
participants. 
We utilized the following measures to minimize 
irrelevant data: 
1. The survey is only shown to workers from the US 
location. Location is also part of the demographic 
questions, and only responses that specified the 
US were considered valid.  
2. Respondents were required to input a password 
that was only shown at completion to get paid. 
We cross-checked responses from Mechanical 
Turk and LimeSurvey to identify invalid 
responses with a blank or incorrect password. 
Respondents were not able to leave any blank 
answer.  
3. We identified incomplete or out of topic 
responses. 
4. We identified responses with unrealistic 
completion times. 
5. We identified responses that have the same IP 
address. We were aware that respondents could 
share a public IP address when behind a Network 
Address Translation (NAT) gateway. They are 
further inspected using measure 1-4 to verify their 
validity. 
 
3.2 Result  
 
We had a total of 435 responses from LimeSurvey. 
With all the measures above, we removed 45 responses 
and had 390 usable responses. Table 1 summarizes 
participant demographics in Study 1. 
 
Table 1: Demographics of Study 1 
Attribute Distribution 
Gender Male (31.03%, n = 121), Female 
(68.97%, n = 269) 
Age 18-25 (20.77%, n = 81), 26-35 
(37.95%, n = 148), 36-45 (21.79%, 
n = 85), 46-55 (13.33%, n = 52), 56 
or above (6.15%, n = 24) 
Education Less than high school (1.42%, n = 
4), High school (34.04%, n = 96), 
Bachelor’s (48.23%, n = 136), 
Honours/Master’s (14.18%, n = 40), 
Doctorate (2.13%, n = 6) 
Employment Student (5.38%, n = 21), Employed 
(58.97%, n = 230), Self-employed 
(13.33%, n = 52), Employed student 
(6.15%, n = 24), Unemployed 
(12.057%, n = 47), Retired (4.1%, n 
= 16) 
Mobile Android (49.49%, n = 193), iOS 
(42.31%, n = 165), Android and 
iOS (4.62%, n = 18), Others 
(3.59%, n = 14) 
Experience 0-1 year (2.82%, n = 11), 2-4 years 
(15.13%, n = 59), 5-7 years 
(31.03%, n = 121), 8 years or more 
(51.03%, n = 199) 
 
We asked the respondents to list the names of each 
group of their contacts. The responses were given in 
free text form, resulting in a wide variety of names. We 
combined the responses from those two questions and 
performed validation; the word frequencies of all 
groups fits a power-law distribution with α = 1.83, p = 
0.02. It is similar to observed distributions for English 
word frequencies (i.e. Moby Dick (α = 1.95) [33]). 
When counting the names, capitalization and 




1. List five types of information/data that you put 
into your mobile device. 
2. What other identifying information does your 
mobile device capture about you? 
Next, related types were identified and combined 
for a smaller and more practical list. We coded specific 
apps into their relevant categories. Some categories are 
further aggregated together by similar functionality or 
synonyms to reduce the number of groups. Table 2 
illustrates some examples. This combination resulted in 
43 types where each type has a frequency of at least 
10. Table 3 shows the 15 most popular types of 
information. 
 
Table 2: Compilation of types 
Types New types Final types 
photos of family photos of family personal 
photos pictures of me 
and my children 
photos of my 
dog 
photos of pet 




facebook social media 









step counter body movement 
how i sleep health 
heart beats per 
minute 
 




RQ: What are the effects of the relevance of 
information types to different recipient, on the 
willingness to disclose? 
We investigate the influence of recipient and type 
of information on mobile device users. Specifically, we 
examine the propensity to disclose certain types of 
information to particular recipients and how much do 
they think the information is necessary or relevant to 
that recipient. 
 
Table 3: 15 most popular types 
Types of information Frequency 
personal photos 325 













browsing history 79 
 
We asked participants to rate their willingness to 
disclose certain types of information towards each 
contacts group and how necessary do they think. To 
measure willingness to disclose, we adapted four 7-
point scales from [34]. We measure perceived 
relevance by using three 7-point scales adapted from 
[25] (see Appendix for complete questionnaire). We 
assessed their reliability and deemed the constructs to 
have an acceptable level [35, 36] of internal 
consistency, i.e. Cronbach’s α values are 0.94 and 0.90 
respectively. During the study, each respondent was 
given three vignettes to respond, where each vignette is 
a combination of types of information and contact 
groups. 
We compiled a list of five possible types of 
information and 15 possible contact groups from Study 
1 and another user study [19] which we conducted to 
investigate the influence of trust and privacy concern 
on self-disclosure from privacy paradox’s perspective. 
Since the resulting 75 combinations were too large to 
fit into a questionnaire, we divided them into three 
questionnaires instead. In each sub-questionnaire, we 
used five out of the 15 contact groups, while the types 
of information remained constant, resulting in 25 
possible combinations. 
To avoid repeat participations, the sub-
questionnaires were conducted consecutively, and we 
utilized TurkPrime (later rebranded as CloudResearch) 
to distribute surveys on MTurk. TurkPrime enabled us 
to exclude previous participants (Workers) from 




We advertised the questionnaires on Mechanical 
Turk for eight days in July 2019. Participants were 
asked to respond to our survey that we implemented on 
LimeSurvey. Participants spent 2 min and 20 seconds 
on average (median = 2 minutes 4 seconds) to 
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complete the survey. Participants were paid USD 0.10 
for completing the survey. We utilized similar 
measures as Study 1’s to minimize junk data. 
We performed several regression diagnostics to 
validate the regression analysis. The Durbin-Watson 
statistic value was 1.99 (p > 0.6), suggesting no 
significant presence of autocorrelation. The Cook’s 
distance value was 0.002, thus no evidence to suggest 
there were highly influential outliers. 
We had a total of 3444 responses from 
LimeSurvey. We utilized similar measures as Study 1’s 
to minimize junk data and removed 555 responses, thus 
remained with 2889 usable responses. Before the data 
analysis, we converted the Likert to a range of -3 to +3. 
Table 4 shows the participants demographics. 
Correlation analysis showed that perceived 
relevance is significantly correlated with self-
disclosure in both frequent and infrequent groups 
(Spearman r = 0.48, p < 0.001). The regression model 
showed relevance explained 26% of the variance in 




Table 4: Demographics of Study 2 
Attribute Distribution 
Gender Male (36.76%, n = 1062), Female 
(63.24%, n = 1827) 
Age 18-25 (22.26%, n = 643), 26-35 
(40.15%, n = 1160), 36-45 (20.84%, 
n = 602), 46-55 (10.76%, n = 311), 
56 or above (5.99%, n = 173) 
Education Less than high school (0.69%, n = 
20), High school (41.36%, n = 
1195), Bachelor’s (43.86%, n = 
1267), Honours/Master’s (12.22%, 
n = 353), Doctorate (1.87%, n = 54) 
Employment Student (7.41%, n = 214), 
Employed (57.29%, n = 1655), Self-
employed (11.15%, n = 322), 
Employed student (7.75%, n = 224), 
Self-employed student (1.14%, n = 
33), Unemployed (12.77%, n = 
369), Retired (2.49%, n = 72) 
Mobile Android (49.43%, n = 1428), iOS 
(44.58%, n = 1288), Android and 
iOS (5.02%, n = 145), Others 
(0.97%, n = 28) 
Experience 0-1 year (2.28%, n = 66), 2-4 years 
(11.46%, n = 331), 5-7 years 
(32.43%, n = 937), 8 years or more 
(53.82%, n = 1555) 
  
Table 5: Regression effect of relevance on 
willingness to disclose 
Criterion Willingness to 
disclose 
Relevance 0.52 (p < 0.001) 
R2 .26 
Adjusted R2 .26 
Significance <0.001 
Standard Error of Estimate 1.679 
F-statistic (1,8665) = 2972 
 
As part of our investigation on the relevance of the 
contextual integrity to the mobile ecosystem, especially 
the privacy aspect. In the previous study, we 
investigate the influence of recipients—a contextual 
factor—on the users’ privacy attitude. The results 
suggest that the different propensity of trust towards 
recipients can influence self-disclosure, despite having 
a privacy concern. 
In this paper, we studied the effect of a combination 
of contextual factors—recipients and type of 
information—on users’ attitude. Specifically, we 
investigated how a combination of those factors can 
affect users’ willingness to disclose and their 
perception of information relevance. From the results, 
we observed another form of privacy paradox—higher 
sensitivity does not necessarily result in lower 
disclosure. For instance, information types that are 
considered to be highly sensitive like health-related 
information and location [27] are not ranked in the 
lower half of the disclosure index (Table 6). Those 
types even rank higher in disclosure index than social 
media information, a type that is previously considered 
to be low sensitivity [37]. Previous studies posit that 
the paradox can be explained by information relevance 
[1, 25] which is a focus of this study. 
 









Location 0.15 0.42 





-0.8 Disclosure Index 0.2 
-0.15 Relevance Index 0.5 




We investigated the relationship between 
willingness to disclose and perceived relevance. The 
result suggests the user is more likely to disclose a 
piece of information when it is perceived as relevance 
and mostly in line with existing studies. While the 
results suggest a significant relationship, it does not 
necessarily hold true in some instances. For instance, 
participants tend to perceive health-related information 
to be quite related on average, yet there is a slight 
resistance in disclosure (Table 6). When looking at 
different combinations of information type and 
recipient, we notice that while participants perceived 
“Contacts” and “Personal Photos” to be slightly 
relevant to “Commercial Organizations”, yet they 
reacted strongly against disclosing those pieces of 
information to that group (Table 10). While the 
recipient group with the highest relevance index also 
has the highest disclosure index and vice versa, we do 
not observe a similar trend in information type. The 
information type with the highest relevance index also 
has the highest disclosure index, but the one with the 
lowest relevance index does not have the lowest 
disclosure index (Table 6 & Table 7). 
Disclosure index may seem to be distinct between 
information types (Table 6). However, when we split it 
into different groups of the recipient, the distinction 
becomes erratic. For instance, when we compare 
“Contacts”—the information type with the lowest 
disclosure index (-0.73) on average—across different 
recipients, the value ranges from -1.61 to 0.49 (Table 
8). Even though it is the lowest on average, when 
comparing across recipients, we notice it is not 
necessarily the lowest. In fact, it is only the lowest in 
two out of nine recipients. A similar discrepancy is 
also apparent in the Relevance index. Take “Location” 
for example, which has the highest relevance index 
(0.42), when divided into varying recipients, the value 
ranges from -0.05 to 1.02 (Table 9). It is highest only 
in three out of nine recipient groups. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
Findings from our studies in this paper highlighted 
the influence of contextual factors—recipient and 
information type—on information exchange within the 
mobile ecosystem. The findings consequently lead to 
two practical implications; first, our results cast doubt 
over the established effects of “sensitivity” and its 
usefulness in PET. Existing studies [38, 39] posit that 
the significant relationship between sensitivity and 
willingness to disclose. If this assumption holds true, 
we can expect a consistent response in willingness to 
disclose a type of information across recipients. This 
study, however, could not reproduce such consistency 
(Table 8) and further demonstrate that sensitivity can 
vary according to the intended recipient. Second, while 
there is evidence of a significant relationship between 
information relevance and disclosure, several 
discrepancies showed the relationship is not always 
clear-cut. Thus, we urge researchers to practice caution 
over the use of generic information relevance in 
predicting the tendency to disclose. 
 












Employers -0.59 -0.16 












-1.2 Disclosure Index 0.8 
-0.5 Relevance Index 0.7 
Each index column is color-coded separately 
 
While not part of the main research question of this 
study, we also examined the demographical 
differences. In this study, we did not find any 
significant difference between genders in propensity in 
disclosing information, nor in most demographics. This 
is contrary to our previous study and in turn, a study by 
Li, et al. [40]. We theorize that the initial difference 
information disclosure behavior diminishes and reacted 
similarly as users take into consideration of 
information relevance. A notable exception is that 
there is evidence of a significant difference between 
age groups. Future study can examine more closely in 



















Acquaintances -0.70 -0.76 -0.63 0.32 0.15  
Commercial 
Organizations 




-0.76 0.02 0.32 -1.17 -0.47 
 
Employers -0.76 -0.01 0.12 -1.26 -1.11  
Family 0.49 1.19 1.04 0.80 0.71  
Financial 
Institutions 
-1.60 -1.25 0.18 -1.70 -1.28 
 
Friends 0.09 0.19 0.58 1.13 0.67  
Healthcare 
Organizations 




-1.15 -0.49 -0.45 -1.11 -0.69 
1.2 











Acquaintances -0.03 -0.20 -0.05 0.11 -0.02  
Commercial 
Organizations 




0.00 0.62 0.40 -0.36 0.07 
 
Employers -0.32 0.54 0.15 -0.67 -0.55  
Family 0.44 1.30 1.02 0.65 0.30  
Financial 
Institutions 
-0.34 -0.69 0.34 -1.00 -0.63 
 
Friends 0.28 0.42 0.65 0.62 0.35  
Healthcare 
Organizations 




-0.32 0.09 -0.01 -0.39 -0.17 
1.4 










Acquaintances 0.67 0.56 0.58 0.21 0.17  
Commercial 
Organizations 
1.68 0.98 0.84 1.34 0.92 
 
Education Institutions 0.76 0.60 0.08 0.81 0.54  
Employers 0.45 0.55 0.03 0.59 0.56  
Family 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.14 0.42  
Financial Institutions 1.26 0.56 0.17 0.70 0.64  
Friends 0.19 0.23 0.07 0.50 0.32  
Healthcare 
Organizations 




0.83 0.58 0.43 0.72 0.52 
1.7 
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In this work, we recruited participants through a 
crowdsourcing platform. Future work could consider 
more crowdsourcing or recruitment platforms to obtain 
larger datasets. Our recruitment process did not involve 
choosing sample users randomly and might lead to 
selection bias. Alternative approaches that enable the 
use of random sampling include web scraping and 
application programming interfaces (APIs) provided by 
the social media platforms that we can utilize to gauge 
public sentiments on the desired topics. Larger datasets 
combining with more sophisticated modelling could 
help uncover constructs that are not observable from 
the limited datasets utilized in this work. Since the 
participants involved in this work only expressed their 
views at a certain point in time, a longitudinal study 
can be conducted to evaluate whether the preferences 
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1. List five types of information/data that you 
put into your mobile device. 
2. What other identifying information does your 
mobile device capture about you? 
 
Study 2 
Disclosure: Seven-point semantic scales [34] 
Please specify the extent to which you would reveal 
<TYPE> to <GROUP>, on the scales that follow. 
1. Unlikely / likely 
2. Not probable / probable 
3. Possible / impossible (r) 
4. Willing / unwilling (r) 
 
Relevance: Seven-point semantic scales [25] 
Please indicate the extent of each factor for your above 
response. 
1. Irrelevant / Relevant 
2. Important / Unimportant (r) 
3. Unnecessary / Necessary 
(r): Reverse item 
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